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ARTHun L. REESE

ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND PROBATE AS EVIDENCE OF
EXECUTION OF DEEDS

It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the acknowledgment of a deed or mortgage is not an indispensable part of
its execution. The recording of the instrument is necessary, for
the giving of notice of its existence, to persons who may purchase the land embraced in it, or acquire liens thereupon, in ignorance of the prior deed or mortgage, and the acknowledgment
[or probate] is the precondition to the recording. One important exception to the statement that acknowledgment is not necessary to the operation of a deed, existed until recently, in respect
to the deeds or mortgages of married women. An acknowledgment by them, before a proper officer and in a special form was
necessary -not merely to the placing of the instrument on record,
but to its going into operation. Like the signing, or the delivery, the acknowledgment was indispensable to its effectiveness,
with respect even to the immediate parties to it. The act of
April 4th, 1901, P. L. 67, provides that acknowledgments by married women shall be taken by any judge, justice of the peace, etc.,
in the same manner and form as though said married women
were femes sole. From this the inference has been drawn that
no acknowledgment is necessary, in order to make the deed, mortgage, or contract, concerning land of any married women, effectual.' "The act of (June 8th) 1893 (P. L. 344), says Pell, J.,
gives a married woman the same power that a feme sole has to
sell her real estate, except that she may not make a valid conveyance unless her husband joins in the deed. The act of 1901 dis'Jenkins v. R. R. Co., 210 Pa., 134.
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penses with the requirement that there should be a separate acknowledgment. She is therefore empowered to make a binding
contract for the sale of her real estate by a written agreement in
which her husband joins without acknowledgment." The doctrine of Cable v. Cable2 that "acknowledgment, as between the
parties, was [is] unnecessary" is now therefore applicable to the
deeds of all sorts of grantors.
Evidential Function of Acknowledgment
For certain purposes, deeds and mortgages must be put on
record. The officer who records them is the recorder or his deputies. But, how can he know whether a deed, brought to him
to be recorded, and purporting to have been executed by X, was
in fact executed by X. There should be some evidence produced
to him, of the genuineness of the deed. If he knew X, and X
personally brought the deed to him in order that it should be
recorded, the evidence would be satisfactory. But there are
thousands of possible grantors of land in a county, and the Recorder is not personally acquainted with a tenth of them. It
would be inconvenient for every grantor to appear in person at
the county seat, in order to make his deed recordable. The legislators have therefore authorized various sorts of officers, some of
whom are to be found at many points in the county, to receive
acknowledgments, and by certifying to them, to furnish authentic information to the Recorder,3 of the genuineness of the instrument. The certificate of acknowledgment is the evidence to
the Recorder, which warrants his placing the deed on record.
Evidence in Court
When a deed or mortgage is put on record by the Recorder,
on the certificate by the proper officer that it has been acknowledged by.the grantor, or probated by a subscribing witness, the
copy or record thus made, or even a copy of this copy, "certified
2146 Pa., 451. There were two grantors only one of whom acknowledged the deed, according to the justice's certificate. It was nevertheless
valid as to both.
3
The recorder may take acknowledgments and probate of deeds and
mortgages of land in his own county-Act of April 6th, 1840.
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under the seal of the proper office, which the recorder is required
to affix thereto," is directed by statute to be received in all courts
where produced," and treated as being "as good evidence, and
as valid and effectual in law, as the original deeds themselves."
The copy which forms the record, or the certified copy of this
copy, is primafacie receivable, as identical in terms with the deed
and as prima facie evidence that the deed was in fact executed
by the person by whom the record or copy purports that it was
executed.
But, when a deed has been acknowledged, or probated, the
recorder has no discretion as to recording it, if it is brought to
him in order to record it. He exercises no independent judgment
concerning its genuineness. As to that, he is concluded by the
official written assertion of the justice of the peace, or other
magistrate. The act of transcribing the deed into the book is
purely clerical, and not at all judicial. It follows then, that if
the record or an official copy therefrom would dispense with
proof of the execution of the deed, in the first instance in a judicial investigation, in which its genuineness was at issue, the certificate of acknowledgmen or probate,' should be prima facie
evidence of the genuineness of the grantor's signature when the
deed itself is offered in evidence, whether, the acknowledgment or
probate has or has not 6 been followed by recording. Huston, J.,
speaking of the recording act, remarks,7 "The copy of the record
under seal is declared and enacted to be as good evidence, and as
valid and effectual in law, as the original deeds themselves. This
must mean as the original acknowledged or proved in such manner as that it could be legally recorded; but, if the original deed,
so acknowledged or proved, could not be allowed to be read, and
was not valid and effectual, the copy could not be; and all our
laws, and all our xecords of deeds are rendered useless. Hitherto
4

Kelly v. Dunlap, 3 P. & W., 136.
v. Porter, 3 P. & W., 132.
Kelly v. Dunlap, 3 P. & W., 136; Jones v. Porter, 3 P. & W., 132.
7
Kelly v. Dunlap, 3 P. & W., 136. The record of a deed is evidence
of its contents. But, the recorder may have made mistakes in copying
it; may, e. g. have omitted the name of one of two grantors, from the
signatures. The jury may be allowed to infer this mistake from the fact
that the certificate of acknowledgment states that both the grantors acknowledged the instrument. Carr v. Frick Coke Co., 170 Pa., 62.
5
Jones
6
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the deed duly acknowledged or proved, or the copy of such deed
when recorded, has always been received in all our courts." In
1867, Agnew, J., declared "A deed proved or acknowledged in
the manner provided by law, is entitled to be received in evidence,
though it never has been recorded. This has been the established
practice, ever since McDill v. McDill, and Hamilton v. Galloway,
1 Dall., 63, 93.28

If a deed or mortgage which is ready for recording, because
it has been acknowledged or probated, is entitled to be received
in evidence without other proof of its execution by the grantor
or mortgagor, it does not lose that prerogative, by the actual
recording. The party claiming under it, may use either the record or a certified copy therefrom, or the deed itself in conjunction
with the certificate of acknowledgment or probate?
When Acknowledgment or Probate May Be Made
There is no particular time after the execution of a deed,
within which it must be acknowledged or probated, in order to
make the acknowledgment or probate, prima facie evidence of its
having been executed by the purporting grantor or mortgageor.
An acknowledgment made 24 years after the delivery of the deed,
and after the suit had been brought, in which the deed was to be
used as evidence, and even only a few weeks before the trial,
justified the reception of the deed, prima facie."° Nor is it necessary that the party to be affected by the deed, at the trial, should
have been notified of the intention to take the acknowledgment or
probate." Hence an advantage may be gained by the proponent
of the deed or mortgage.. If he has to prove the execution of
the deed, he must produce his witnesses in the face of the opposite party and subject them to cross-examination. If he uses the
probate the witnesses who made it are not before the court, and
cannot be cross-examined. The certificate of probate, perpetuates their testimony and makes it prima facie proof of the execution of the instrument.
sKeichline v. Keichline, 54 Pa., 75.
9
Gustine v. Westenberger. 224 Pa., 455.
'0 Kelly v. Dunlap, 3 P. & W., 136; Jones v. Porter, 3 P. & W., 132.
"Jones v. Porter, 3 P. & W., 132.
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Before Whom May Acknowledgment Be Made
The Acts of Assembly have conferred upon various officers the
power to receive acknowledgments or probates of recordable
instruments. Into their details, it is not the purpose to enter.
Judges of the Supreme Court, of the Courts of Common Pleas, 2
justices of the peace,"3 recorders of deeds,' 4 notaries public,"5 are
some of them.
The Probate
It may happen that the acknowledgment of a deed is not procurable. The making of it may have been neglected at the time
of executing and delivering the deed. The grantor, from fraud,
caprice, malice, may, when requested subsequently to acknowledge it, refuse. He may have departed from the State or his locality may be unknown. He may have died. The 2d section of the
act of May 28th, 1715, providing for the recording of deeds, required that if the grantor was dead or could not appear to make
acknowledgment, two or more of the witnesses who were present
at the execution of the deed, might be brought before a justice of
the peace, by whom he should be examined on oath or affirmation,
to prove the execution of the deed. He was then to certify the
proof upon the back of the deed, designating the witnesses who
made it, and the day and year when it was made.Y The act of
March 18th, 1775, provided for probate of deeds by one or more
of the subscribing witnesses before a judge of the Supreme Court
or of the common pleas. The act of Sept. 30th, 1791, extended
the power to take probates, to justices of the peace. The probate
may be taken, whether the grantor is alive or not. It is not necessary to justify the resort to the probate, by showing the impracticability of obtaining an acknowledgment."' Proof by one

' 2Luffborough v. Porter, 12 S. & R., 48.
'3 Shiffer v. Broadhead, 126 Pa., 260.

' 4Act of April 6th, 1840.
5Sect.

2, Act of Aug. 10th, 1864; Com. v. Haines, 97 Pa., 228; Smith

v. Markland. 223 Pa., 605; Gustine v. Westenberger, 224 Pa., 455.
11A proof by one only of the witnesses, did not entitle the deed to be
recorded, nor make a copy of the deed, certified by'the recorder, evidence
of its7 execution; Vickroy v. McKnight, 4 Binn., 204.
2 Shiffer v. Broadhead, 126 Pa., 260.
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subscribing witness, is sufficient."8 If the grantee, or one of several
grantees, becomes a subscribing witness, probate by him will not
warrant the recording of the deed 9 nor, therefore can the probate dispense with proof at the trial by the proponent of the execution of the instrument. Possibly, if the only subscribing witness is dead, proof of his hand-writing would be a sufficient probate of the deed, but there being three subscribing witnesses,
one of whom is dead, proof of his hand-writing will not be sufficient, unless there is evidence before the officer who certifies to
the probate, that the other subscribing witnesses could not be procured."0 When the name Alexafider Power appears on the deed
as a subscribing witness, and the judge who takes the probate certifies that Alexander Power appeared before him and made probate, the identity of the latter person with the subscribing witness sufficiently appears, to justify the reception of the deed. 2 ' It
seems to be assumed in Jones v. Porter,22 that although a witness,
when he subscribes to a deed and makes probate of it has no interest therein, if he subsequently acquires such an interest, and, in order to enforce such interest, becomes a party to a suit, his probate
ceases to justify the reception of the deed in evidence. Huston,
J., takes pains to show that the John Porter who proved the will,
as subscribing witness, was probably not John Porter, who was
plaintiff in the ejectment.
The Acknowledgment Only Prima Facie Evidence
The certificate of the acknowledgment or of the probate of a
deed, is prima facie evidence of its having been executed by the
purporting grantor or mortgageor. By this is meant, not merely
18126 Pa., 260; Velott v. Lewis, 102 Pa., 326.
'290Gibson v. Penn, 24 C. C., 244.
Velott v. Lewis, 102 Pa., 326. It is not quite clear that the evidence
of inability to command the presence of the other witnesses, must have been
presented to the officer who took the probate. Gordon. 3., says, that the
death of one of the witnesses may be inferred from the language of the.
proving witness. "His said late father," that the father (one of the subscribing witnesses) was then dead, but he adds "there is no proof [where?
in the certificate of probate?] that the others were not then in full life,
it appear that they could not have been produced."
nor does
21
Luffborough v. Parker, 12 S. & R., 48.
223 P. & W., 132. But, see 23 P. & L. Dig. 41590 et seq.
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that the judge who conducts the trial, must allow it to be submitted to the jury but that it will be the duty of the jury to treat
it as genuine in making up its verdict, unless there is counteracting evidence submitted, that the deed is not genuine.
Falseness of the Certificate
The value of the certificate depends on the truth of its assertion that the grantor appeared before the certifying justice and
made the acknowledgment. The fact may have been that nobody, purporting to be the grantor, appeared, or made an acknowledgment. A specimen of this occurs in Michener v. Cavender,2" where the mortgage upon the wife's property purported'to
be made by George W. Michener and his wife. George only appeared before the alderman, to make the acknowledgment, but
the certificate stated that both he and the wife appeared, and that
she was separately examined, etc. The alderman signed this certificate before noticing that the mortgage was by Mrs. Michener,
also. He remarked on the absence of Mrs. Michener, but was
told by George W. that it was only a temporary matter between
him and the mortgagee. Thereupon the alderman allowed Geo.
W. to take away the mortgage with this false certificate of acknowledgment upon it.
Who Proves the Falseness?
In Michener v. Cavender, the alderman denied facts averred
by him in his own certificate. It was not, apparently thought
that he was precluded from contradicting his own certificate, even
when the contradiction of it would injure the mortgagee who bona
fide accepted the mortgage, and advanced his money upon it, in
reliance on the certificate.24 The trial court told the jury that
the alderman's testimony did not constitute a defense, unless the
mortgagee had notice of the fact that the certificate was untrue.
It is impossible to say whether the court meant that the testamony would be a defense, or the fact averred therein, if the tes2338

24

Pa., 334.

Cf. Davis v. Monroe, 187 Pa., 212, where the justice who took the
acknowledgment, testified that the deed was procured by a fraud practiced
on the grantor.
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timony was found to be true. The certificate under an official
oath, asserted that Mrs. Michener had appeared and acknowledged the signature to the deed. Was the jury to treat this certificate as untrue merely because the maker of it was now giving
a different story? The verdict was in favor of the mortgagee,
whether because he was a bona fide purchaser, or because the jury
did not believe the testimony of the alderman. The supreme
court, thinking the bona fides of the mortgagee of no importance,
reversed the judgment and without a venire facias de novo; apparently assuming that the alderman's testimony had to be belieyed, and his certificate disbelieved.
Certificate False.

Justice Imposed Upon by Personation

The justice's certificate may be due to his being deceived
with respect to the person who appears before him and makes
the acknowledgment. A mortgage purports to have been made
by Abraham P. Beecher, but the name has been forged by X. X
comes before the notary, calls himself Abraham P. Beecher, and
the person named as grantor, and the notary receives and certifies to his acknowledgment. Discovering the forgery, the mortgagee or his bona fide assignee, not attempting to enforce the
mortgage2" will even not be able to obtain redress from the
notary, if he acted in good faith and without negligence. He is
not under a duty to refuse to certify an acknowledgment, unless
he personally knows the acknowledging person. It is not necessary that he should be able to say, when he is sued upon his official bond, that he remembers that he took any precautions, when
he says that he must have been satisfied at the time he took the
acknowledgment, that it was all right. The legal inference, says
Mercur, J., is, that he acted on reasonable information. The
burden is on the plaintiff to prove a clear and intentional dereliction of duty.2 6 Ordinarily, the proof of the forgery and of the
forger's personation before the justice is made, in an action to
enforce the rights ostensibly arising from the instrument; e. g. a
25

He could not according to the principles of Michener v. Cavender;
Reinman v. Moon, 12 Pitts. L. J. N. S., 167; Smith v. Markland, 223 Pa.,
605. 2
ComM. v. Haines, 97 Pa., 228.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

229

sci fa upon a mortgage." Sometimes, the proof is offered in a
proceeding in equity to cancel the deed.2" A mortgage was executed and acknowledged by some one that personated Westenberger. He testified that he had not executed it; had never appeared before the notary public; that he first saw it when the
case was called for trial at a previous term of court. His wife
had induced her brother to personate her husband, in executing
and acknowledging the mortgage. The notary was unable to
say that Westenberger had signed and acknowledged it before
him. James, a witness to the execution, and who was at the
notary's office, testified positively that Westenberger was not the
man who had signed and acknowledged it in his presence.
Another witness stated that W. was not the man who had executed the mortgage in his office. Still another, who finally negotiated the loan and saw the mortgage signed, testified that W. was
not the person who executed it. The wife of W. admitted on the
trial, that she needed money, and asked her brother to personate
her husband. The trial court without error, told the jury that, in
its opinion, by which they were not bound, at all, the weight of
the evidence was against the certificate. It also told the jury
that it was unable to say that the certificate of the notary was
sufficient and strong evidence of the genuineness of the mortgage.
It is evidenced, but if the facts certified are successfully attacked,
the certificate as evidence, is not sufficient and not strong. If the
evidence, in the jury's opinion overwhelms it with defeat, it is no
29
evidence. They will not be governed by it at all.
How Is The Certificate Proved?
When what purports to be a certificate of a notary, justice
of the peace, etc., is offered to the recorder of deeds, in order to
induce his recording of the deed, how is he to know whether the
signature to the certificate, was written by the person whose name
it is? How is he to know that this person was a notary or a
justice? When the certificate is used in a court, as prima facie
27

Gustine v. Westenberger, 224 Pa., 455; Reinman v. Moon, 12 Pitts.

L. J.2 8N. S., 167.

Smith v. Markland, 223 Pa., 605.

29Gustine

v. Westenberger, 224 Pa., 455. A mortgage purporting to
be by the husband forged at the procurement of a wife, is not valid.
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evidence of the execution of the instrument by the purporting
grantor or mortgageor, the same questions present themselves.
The signature is self-proving. The authority of the notary, justice, etc., is to be assumed. "Nor is it necessary," says Agnew,
J., "to prove the hand-writing of the magistrate. His certificate
is prima facie evidence of his authority and his signature."3 0
There is always a possibility that there is no notary of the name,
or that, if there is such notary, he has not made the certificate.
The burden of proof will be upon those who so allege. The date
of the acknowledgment, as set forth in the certificate, must be
taken to be correct, until other evidence convinces of its inaccuracy. When, e. g. a creditor of A claims land under a sheriff's
sale on a judgment, and the opposite party claims it under a conveyance from A before the recovery of the judgment, the date of
the acknowledgment of the deed, if earlier than the recovery of
the judgment, will prima facie establish fhe priority of the conveyance to the judgment.3 '
3
°Keichline
3

v. Keichline, 54 Pa., 75.
Hultz v. Ashley, 63 Pa., 142; Cover v. Manaway, 115 Pa., 338.

MOOT COURT
KNOWLTON v.WOOD
Stock Gambling
STATEMENT OF.FACTS
Knowlton ordered Wood, a broker, to buy 500 shares of Reading Co.
common stock for his account, provided Wood would advance the purchase price and hold the stock as security. Wood did so and agreed to
so carry it as long as Knowlton paid the prevailing rate of interest, less
dividends received on the stock. Knowlton agreed to pay Wood any sum
that might be lost on a resale of the stock and Wood agreed in no event
to require Knowlton to take up the stock and pay the entire price.
Knowlton was not in circumstances that would have made this possible
nor could he borrow such a sum from any other source. Knowlton made
interest payments when due and finally ordered a resale at a price that
showed a profit of $5,000.00 over the purchase price.
This is an action to recover the $5,000.00.
Kachel for plaintiff.
Leopold for defendant.
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THE OPINION OF THE COURT
ROSENBERG, J. The point of contention in the case at bar is:
Did a gambling transaction exist between Knowlton and Wood? The law
in Pennsylvania on this subject looks at the intention of the parties, without considering the form of the transaction. A transaction which on
its face is legal cannot be held void as a wagering contract by showing
that one person only so understood and meant it to be. The understanding between the parties must be mutual. Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S., 481;
47 Fed. Rep. 574. MacDonald v. Gessler, 208 Pa., 177.
What evidence is there that shows the contract to be of an illegal
nature? None whatever. The plaintiff requested the defendant, a broker,
to loan him some money, with which money the said defendant purchased
the stocks. Is not a man allowed to borrow money to enter into a business transaction? This was a pure debt, for which the defendant held
the stocks as security.
A wagering contract is defined as one in which the parties agree
that they shall gain or lose upon the happening of an undetermined event
in which they have no interest except that arising from the possibility of
such gain or loss. The plaintiff bought the stock with the money which
he borrowed from defendait. Would you call that money the plaintiff's
interest or rather money borrowed and thrown away? Fareira v. Gabell,
89 Pa., 89.
If two men agree that if tea rises in price, one of them shall pay a sum
of money to the other, it is a wager, if they had no other interest in the
tea than that growing out of the contingency about which they stipulate.
If they had, it is a contract of indemnity and not a wager.
It appears also that plaintiff paid the interest whenever due, until
the resale of the stock. That fact alone shows that he purchased the stock
in good faith. No man having common .sense would expend money for
something which he knew would be of no avail to him.
The most important constituent of a wager is the intention-the mutual
intention of the parties. Leonard v. Blackley, 16 Forum, 210, Austin's
Appeal, 192 Pa., 309. Although Knowlton "was not in circumstances
that would have made it possible to take up the stock and pay the entire
price," yet he might have intended to purchase. Maybe the unforseen
would happen; and he would acquire enough money (in a manner which
does not concern us) to pay his debt. It may be that the broker really
intended this transaction to be a gamble, but did the purchaser intend to
gamble? If either party intends an actual sale, he may enforce the contract, though the other party intends a wager. Tiffany on Sales, p. 144.
In Lex's Appeal, 192 Pa., 313, it was held that when a customer of a
broker elects to treat a transaction in stocks as a purchase, and to settle
his-account on that basis, the transaction is valid, whatever may have been
its original character. Anthony v. Unangst, 174 Pa., 10. Even if the
broker was mistaken as to the customer's motive or expectation, it has no
effect on the agreement. 9 Cyc., 395.
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The learned counsel for the defendant contdnds that there was not a
sufficient delivery of the stocks to plaintiff. Various authorities say that
the question of delivery of the stocks to the purchaser in person has nothing to do with the validity of the transaction. Howard's Appeal, 192 Pa.,
304. In this case no delivery to the purchaser was necessary, for the
broker held the stocks as security for the money which he laid out.
When Knowlton ordered Wood to resell the stocks, the delivery by
the sale was a legal delivery to Knowlton, for it was a delivery to his
vendee. Young, Smyth, Field & Company v. Gendinning, 194 Pa., 550.
Defendant really bought the stocks while acting as plaintiff's agent,
and a trusteeship was created in him for the stocks so purchased. The
law always presumes that whatever was done during the existence of the
agency, was done under and through the agency. An agent to purchase
cannot be allowed (except when given permission by his principal) to purchase for himself. He acquires nothing by such adverse purchase, even
though he contribute of his own means to effect it, the product will belong
to the principal exclusively. Bergner v. Bergner, 219 Pa., 113.
Where after the stocks have been bought by the broker, he is actually
to receive them from the seller and pay for them out of his own money,
and then carry them for his customer as long as his customer keeps him
indemnified from loss by keeping the margin agreed upon good, or by
paying the interest when due, there is a contractual relation between the
customer and the broker, and the transaction is not illegal. Rice v.
Winslow, 180 Mass., 500; Post v. Leland, 184 Mass., 601.
A case very similiar to the one under consideration is a leading Pennsylvania case. Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa., 163. It holds that if one buys
stock from X and borrows the money from Y, to pay for it, there is no
element of gambling in the operation, though he pledges the stock with
Y as security for the money. So, if instead of borrowing the money from
Y, a third person, he borrows it from X or procures X to carry the stock
for him, with or without the margin, the transaction is not necessarily
different in character. Hopkins, Receivers v. O'Kane, 169 Pa., 478.
In summing up all the above cited cases, we get the proposition that
when a broker buys what he is ordered to buy, and sells it when ordered
to do so, he is simply a broker, and not a gambler. Therefore the $5,000.00,
the profit of a legal transaction, rightfully belongs to the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The question involved in this case is: "If a man possesses the specu
lative instinct but lacks the money with which to gratify it, is it lawful
for another to provide the necessary money, to act as agent for the borrower in investing it, to agree to continue the loan for an indefinite period
and finally to agree to look primarily to the proceeds of a resale of the
securities for a repayment of the loan."
In Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa., 163, Justice Mitchell gave utterance to
the following dictum: "A purchase of stock for speculation, even when
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done merely on margin, is not necessarily a gambling transaction. If
one buys stock from A, and borrows the money from B to pay for it, there
is no element of gambling in the operation, though he pledge the stock
with B as security for the money. So if instead of borrowing the money
from B, a third person, he borrows it from A to 'carry' the stock for him,
with or without margin, the transaction is not necessarily different in character. But in this latter case, there being no transfer or delivery of the
stock, the doubt arises whether the parties intended there should ever be
a purchase or delivery at all. Here is the dividing line. If there was not
under any circumstances to be a delivery, as part of and completing a purchase, then the transaction was a mere wager on the rise and fall of prices,
but if there was in good faith a purchase, then the delivery might be postponed, or made to depend on a further condition, and the stock carried on
margin or otherwise, in the meanwhile, without affecting the legality of
the operation. * * * * In dealing with stock transactions falling within or
in any way connected with wagering contracts the law of Pennsylvania
is of exceptional, and for myself, I would say, of illogical and untenable
severity in its interference with the business contracts of parties sui juris,
and entirely competent to manage their own affairs. * * * * Even Fareira
v. Gabell, 89 Pa., 89, and Ruchizky v. DeHaven, 97 Pa., 202, two extreme cases of which it is justly said by Mr. Biddle in his Law of Stock
Brokers, p. 308, that they are 'opposed in principle to all the decisions,
both of the English courts, and of every court of every State in the
Union,' were decided upon the ground that the cause of action was loss
in the illegal transactions. Gains in the same transactions would undoubtedly stand upon the same footing, but it must be said to the honor of a
class of business men often harshly criticized, that cases of refusal by a
broker to pay over profits to his customers, are "of the rarest occurrence."
The present case is one of those cases "of the rarest occurrence."
Judges and juries are apt to sympathize with an individual sued by a
broker for losses not covered by the margin deposited. A recovery often
means the destitution of the customer, and the consequent suffering of
his innocent wife and children, who may become additional burdens upon
the community. The plaintiff is usually a rich banking house and its
defeat in its action means only a loss of profits. There is enough of
socialism in the average jury to lead them to stretch the law to save the
customers in these cases. An examination of the earlier cases in Pennsylvania shows the judges to have been influenced by these same consideratiohs. But in Peters v. Grim and the cases following it, we find a revolt against the rule of the earlier cases.
Let us apply the dictum of Justice Mitchell to the case in hand. The
purchase was made purely for speculation. The customer did not contribute a single dollar toward the purchase price. No margin was deposited. He had little or no credit With any one ,else. A moderate loss
on the stock, say $10 per share, would have meant an indebtedness by him
to the broker of $5000. Could the broker have collected this in the face
of the stipulation that the customer was not to be required to take and

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

pay for the stock? "If," says Justice Mitchell "there was not under any
circumstances to be a delivery, as part of and dompleting a purchase, then
the transaction was a mere wager on the rise and fall of prices." But it
is to be noted that in the present case there was no reciprocal promise on
the part of the customer not to require the broker to deliver the stock, if
he should tender the full price, interest and commissions. Perhaps this
was understood, and not expressed, only because the customer's lack of
both funds and credit made this a most unlikely possibility. Should the
case have been left to the jury to speculate as to the existence of this
understanding? We think not. The early cases laid great stress upon
the customer's financial ability.to take and pay for the stocks! ordered.
But in Fearon v. Little, 227 Pa., 348, though the suit was against the customer, and his transactions had amounted to $12,000,000.00 in two years,
on a small margin, Justice Stewart held that binding instructions should
have been given for the plaintiff. The defense was' that the broker did
not buy with the intention to deliver to his customer. But it was held to
be enough if both understood that the stocks were actually to be bought,
"with a view to their delivery to the customer, upon demand and payment therefor," i. e. in case the customer should develop ability to make
such payment. This he might do by finding a purchaser to make the payment for him or by finding some one who would pay off the loan and
carry the stock on more favorable terms. If the broker carries' out this
understanding and buys the stock outright, there is no objection to his
earning a second commission by reselling the stock for the customer.
The clearest expression of this view that we have seen is the opinion
of Judge Br~gy in Young & Co. v. Glendinning, 194 Pa., at p. 559. "It
may well be," says he, "that Graham intended to gamble, but the more
important question is, did the stock broker intend to gamble. It seems
to me that if the broker buys what he is ordered to buy and sells it when
he is told to sell it, he is a broker and not a gambler. I think the distinction is, was it intended that the stocks shuld be bought or sold? If it was,
it is not gambling and the question of delivery to the customer in person has
nothing to do with it."
"A delivery by sale as ordered by him is a legal delivery to him, for it
is a delivery to his vendee. If it was not the intention to really buy, or
sell, but the understanding, however reached, was that no real purchase
was to be made and no sale was to take place, but that the difference in
market value was to be settled by the loser paying his loss to the winner,
or, to put it in other words, that they were to settle with each other, when
they did settle, as if there had been a purchase and sale, that would be
gambling." That some stock brokers do stand ready to take the other
side of any bet on the market a customer cares to make and do this for a
one per cent. deposit, whereas they require from ten to fifteen per cent.
margin before they will actually purchase the stock for the customer, is
explained in the testinlony of a broker reported in McNaughton Co. v.
Haldeman, 160 Pa., 144, at pp. 145 and 146.
Judge Br~gy defines "margin" thus: "Margin is a deposit of money
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or securities to cover the difference between the price of the stock bought
and what the broker is willing to lend on it." The transaction involved
was thus described: "When Graham ordered stocks bought, the firm
bought and paid for them. They credited him with the amount he paid on
the stocks and loaned him the balance, and charged him with interest
thereon. They also charged the regular commission of one-eighth of one
per cent. They did not put the certificates of stock in the name of Graham,
but held it in their own name, or in the name it was in when they
bought it, with a power of attorney to transfer." The stocks were loaned
by them from one customer to another without consulting the lender.
On p. 553, see. 16, we read: "The defendants in the course of their business would, whenever the occasion demanded it, make the delivery of
stocks sold short for their customers from the lot of stocks they had in
hand, bought for some other customer, in which case the ability to deliver to
their customer the stock they had bought for him depended on the financial
ability of the house." All these transactions are lawful for the simple reason that the house runs no risks and a bet involves risks for each better.
If the broker buys when he is told to buy, the advance in the market price
of the stock cannot hurt him, for the stock held for the customer is advancing with the rest. If he sells it for another customer, who is selling
"short," he still runs no risk, for the second customer is bound to replace
the stock however high the stock may go in price.
The "Bucket Shop Act" of 1907, P. L. 359, vol. 5, Stewart's Purdon,
p. 5571, was doubtless intended to fix the law on this subject and it was
not mentioned by the court below. A single offer to make a contract of
the illegal type makes the place where it is made a bucket shop, f6r proof
of the offer is conclusive proof that such is the character of the place.
To be illegal the "proprietor" or both parties must intend that the contract may be closed according to market quotations, without any actual transaction on the exchange, or that it shall be treated as closed when the market quotation reaches a certain figure, or that a settlement shall be based
upon, differences in the prices at which the property is or is claimed to be
bought or sold." We do not understand the last clause to render a contract illegal whether or not the property is actually bought, unless' it be
understood that the customer does not care whether the order is executed
or not. If such is the case, and the broker agrees to take the transaction
as a bet, his subsequent resolution to execute the order would not legalize
the transaction. The purchase would be taken as made on his own account to protect him from loss on his bet. It has been held, however, that
a customer may elect to treat an order as a purchase and, if he does so
and demands the stock, the broker may be compelled to deliver it, however much it may have advanced in price since the order. "This made
it valid whatever had been its original character." Lex's App., 192 Pa.,
313, approved in 194 Pa., at p. 562. If the customer alone can convert an
illegal transaction into a lawful one by this simple expedient, whenever
the market favors him, why should not the broker have a like right if the
market favors him? Does he stand a better chance to recover if he proves
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a tender of the stock and sues for the full price? We think not, unless the
customer has demanded the stock and when his demand has been honored,
he declines to accept it. This was, the case in Anthony v. Unangst, 174
Pa., 10.
It is undoubtedly true that there is ample authority in the earlier
cases for saying that it is immaterial whether the broker actually executes
the orders or not, the vital question being whether the customer is bound
to- receive or deliver. For-example, in Champlin v. Smith, 164 Pa., at p.
487, Judge McIlvaine, after finding that the contracts made by the broker
in execution of the orders in question were perfectly lawful, held that,
"notwithstanding this fact, the broker and his! customer could have had a
contract between themselves that would be illegal." If the broker agreed
not to reveal his customer's name, "but would himself stand as principal
in the deals he made with his fellow brokers and would assume all responsibility as to the delivery of the grain, etc., but would allow Smith
to have the benefit of the deals, he ordered without being bound to receive
or deliver any wheat, corn or pork, and agreed to pay him all the gains he
made on sales provided Smith would pay him his commissions and make
good all losses on sales, and would keep deposited with him sufficient margins to protect him against the losses', then the contract would be a gambling contract." This opinion was affirmed, cum laude, by the Supreme
Court. We do not understand that the disclosure of his principal by a
broker is customary. We understand the contrary to be true and we do
not think the broker's relation to his customer is rendered illegal by the
mere fact that they agree that this custom shall be observed. An undisclosed principal is liable to the third party, regardless of the agreement
between the principal and the agent. An agent is none the less an agent
because he conceals his principal and assumes primary liability to the
third party, and the agent's purchase may vest the title in the principal
though the agent has a lien for money advanced to make the purchase.
Does the further agreement that the customer shall not be bound to receive
or deliver his orders necessarily make the agreement illegal? If the purchases by the broker are intended to be on account of the customer and to
vest the title in the customer, the customer should be liable to reimburse
the broker for the outlay made on his behalf. But why should an-agreement to enforce this liability by first realizing on the collateral, the stock
purchased and held by the broker, render the transaction illegal?
Again, in his charge to the jury, Judge Willson said, in Wagner v.
Hildebrand, 187 Pa., 136, that if the brokers understood that the customer
"never intended to take up or to have delivered to him the shares of stock
or bonds, but that the only settlement of the .transactions between them
was by the payment by them to him of profits or by his payment to them
of losses," or if the broker knows that "the customer is not ordering the
purchase of stocks or bonds for the purpose of taking them or holding
them, but simply for the purpose of waiting for an advance in the market
and selling or buying for the purpose of making a profit," the transaction is
illegal. The Supreme Court, affirmed saying: "The distinction made in
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the cases between transactions where there are actual purchases or sales,
and deliveries made or contemplated, and transactions which by the
mutual understanding of the parties are to be settled by the payment of
differences is very accurately and clearly defined it the charge in this case."
Contrast with this the following from the pen of Mr. Justice Mitchell
in Taylor & Co.'s Assigned Estate, 192 Pa., 304: "It has been settled
by this court so often that it ought not to require reiteration that dealing
in stocks even on margins is not gambling. Stocks are as legitimate subjects of speculative buying or selling as flour, dry goods or pig iron. A
man may buy any commodity, stock included, to sell on an expected rise,
or sell 'short' to acquire and deliver on an expected fall, and it will not
be gambling. Margin is nothing but security, and a man may buy on
credit, with security or without, or on borrowed money, and the money
may be borrowed from his broker as well as from a third person. The
test is did he intend to buy or only to settle on differences." And again at
page 312: "A man may speculate by buying and selling upon expectation
of the rise or fall of the market and he is not thereby gambling. Whether
he dealt for that purpose or for investment, and whether he held his purchases an hour, or a day or a year, are wholly immaterial except as evidence. The test is whether he bou'ght and sold, and not merely settled on
differences with no intention at any time of taking his purchases or delivering his sales. That and that only is gambling."
In Jennings v. Morris, 211 Pa., 600, the broker failed to collect a balance due on a cotton speculation, for the reason that he entirely failed to
show that he had bought the cotton, where he had it stored, his warehouse receipts, etc., but the Supreme Court condemned the defence of the
defendant as clearly dishonest.
In McDonald v. Gessler, 208 Pa., 177, the contract was held legal,
though made in a bucket shop, because the broker understood that the
customer "wanted the stocks purchased outright" and this was done.
One reviewing the cases of this type is struck by the large number of
opinions by Justice Mitchell. His advanced ideas were first expressed in
Ruchizky v. DeHaven, 97 Pa., 202, and he (at that date being but a lower
court judge) was reversed by the Supreme Court, Justice Gordon being of
the opinion that sales on margin were clearly illegal. A comparison of
that opinion with Justice Mitchell's opinion in Hopkins v. O'Kane, 169
Pa., 478, shows the effect of his influence. Though there were no deliveries or payments made by the broker to the customer, it was held there
was no gambling since there were "actual purchases and sales in which
the stocks bought were received by the broker for the defendant, and those
sold delivered by them for him to the purchasers." In Gaw v. Bennett,
153 Pa., 247, in which the court shows a disposition to revert to the strictness of the early cases, Justice Mitchell dissents.
A very remarkable criticism of the strictness of the early cases is reported in Dickson's Exrs. v. Thomas, 97 Pa., 278, in which the lower
court tells the jury that the English decisions are our "source of purest
law." Judge Thayer's charge to the jury in Smith v. Bouvier, 70 Pa.,
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325, exhibits a clear understanding of the subject and may safely be followed to-day. We would also commend the clear and fully reported brief
of appellant's counsel in Thompson v. Rieber, 123 Pa., 457, a case of a
bank cashier who bought $275,000 worth of oil in six weeks and resold
at a profit of $10,000. But Justice Paxson thought it doubtful if this were
gambling. With this case should be compared Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72
Pa., 155, in which Justice Agfiew denounces such dealings and points out
the evil consequences not only for the parties involved but for the public.
Under the doctrine of the latter case if A paid B $500 for a year's option
on B's house and lot at $10,000, it would be gambling, if A had no intention of exercising the option unless he could find a buyer for
the property at a price exceeding $10,000. From Brua's Appeal, 55 Pa.,
294, the reader would infer that "short" sales are per se illegal. This
idea was corrected as early as Maxton v. Gheen, 75 Pa., 166. Justice Gordon seemed to think the purchases and sales by brokers a "mere pretence,"
where the purchases are made on margin and the sales are short sales.
North v. Phillips, 89 Pa., 250, and Gheen, Morgan & Co. v. Johnson, 90
Pa., 38.
In the light of the recent cases we think the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

POLLARD v. KNOX
Bills of Lading Act-Warehouse Receipt Act-A Purchaser of a Bill
of Lading in Negotiable Form Takes Title to the Goods Represented Thereby, Where the Goods Were Given to the Consignor by
the Owner to Defraud His Creditors-Act of Replevin will not Lie.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pollard being indebted and wishing to conceal his assets, had some of
his goods placed in a warehouse by his friend Gordon and some he had
Gordon ship by rail. Gordon deposited the goods in the warehouse and
made the consignment by rail, not disclosing Pollard's interest in the
goods and by both warehouse receipt and bill of lading, the goods were
deliverable to Gordon's order. Gordon later sold all the goods to Knox
who paid fair value in cash and in ignorance of Pollards interest in them.
Replevin.
Haberstroh, for the plaintiff.
Kearney, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GUNTER, J., An interpretation of the facts is first necessary, "Gordon sold all the goods to Knox," etc. If this means that Gordon himself
delivered up the bill, regained possession of the GOODS and sold the
GOODS to Knox, a different question might arise for at common law the
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rights of an innocent purchaser of a bill of lading were not so great
as those given him under the act of 1911, but the rights of an innocent
purchaser of goods remain the same. If we should say that what Gordon sold was the GOODS and not the BILLS then the question might
arise "Are these additional rights which are given the innocent purchaser
by the bill taken away from the fact that the holder of the bill instead of
negotiating it to him delivers up the bills, gets the GOODS and then
sells the GOODS to the innocent purchaser?" We think that under such
circumstances Knox would not acquire these additional rights for at the
time of sale the bill would be a spent bill and not in existence. We
believe, however, that Gordon sold the BILLS and not the GOODS to
Knox, for if part of the goods were shipped by rail, it is not profitable or
practicable that Gordon would go to the place to which they were sent
and there take possession of them, when he could simply negotiate the bills
to Knox and easily dispose of them.
Having assumed that what was sold was the Bills, we are therefore
called upon to construe certain sections of the Uniform Bills of Lading
and Warehouse Receipts Acts, upon which on account of their recent enactment few if any decisions have been made.
The first thing we shall try to ascertain is the point at which Gordon
conceived the evil intention of defrauding his friend Pollard. This is
largely a matter of conjecture, but reason leads us to believe that this intention can not be imputed to him at the time the goods were handed over
to him by Pollard, for inasmuch as Pollard's intention was to defraud
his creditors, it would be the safe and natural thing to have the bills made
out to Gordon, for if made out to Pollard the creditors could under section 25 of the Bills of Lading act and section 26 of the Warehouse receipts act get such aid by injunction and otherwise in attaching such bills.
If Pollard's creditors were at his heels it is easily conceivable that Pollard would desire the bills be negotiable and in the name of his friend
Gordon, who could then sell the bill for Pollard and turn over the money
to him, thereby getting the better of his creditors. It can therefore safely be assumed that Gordon's breach of duty did not occur before or at
the making or the negotiating of the bill.
But even if Pollard did not want Gordon to take a negotiable bill or
to transfer the bills yet the negotiation of these while it is a breach of
duty, is not impaired by such breach.
Section 38 of the bills of lading act covers this point and provides:
"That the validity of negotiation of a bill is not impaired by the fact that
such negotiation was a breach of duty on the part of the person making
the negotiation if the person to whom the bill was negotiated was a purchaser in good faith and for value." Counsel for the plaintiff claims that
this section simply provides that the NEGOTIATION shall not be impaired by reason of the breach of faith, and that it does not attempt to
define the EFFECTS of such negotiation.'
But section 38 merely elaborates for the sake of clearness certain cases within section 31 which reads:
"A negotiable bill may be negotiated by any person in possession of the
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same, HOWEVER SUCH POSSESSION MAY HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED if by the terms of the bill the carrier undertakes to deliver the
goods to the order of such person or if at the time of the negotiation the
bill is in such form that it may be negotiated by delivery." Reading both
sections together it is difficult for us to see how these sections could
make the negotiation valid without at the same time indicating the effects
of such negotiation, to wit, that in as much as the negotiation is valid
then the effect it has is to give effect and as a good title to the innocent purchaser. It is true section 32 defines the effects but these effects
are the outgrowth of the broad principle laid down in section 31.
A person to whom a negotiable bill has been duly negotiated acquires
by section 32 such title to the goods as the person negotiating the bill to
him had or HAD ABILITY TO CONVEY to a purchaser in good faith
for value, and also such title to the goods as the consignor and consignee
HAD OR HAD POWER TO CONVEY TO a purchaser in good faith
for value. Here Gordon was negotiator, consignor and consignee. Did
he have title to the goods? No. Did Ite
have ability to convey title? We
think he did, for section 51 of the Bills of Lading Act and section 56 of
the Warehouse Receipts states: "In cases not provided for in this act
the rules of Law and Equity, including Law Merchant AND IN PARTICULAR THE RULES OF LAW RELATING TO LAW OF PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT SHALL GOVERN."
Gordon was Pollard's agent in depositing and shipping the separate
goods and therefore Pollard being the principal we must next apply the
law of Principal and Agent.
Gordon here had all the indicia of ownership. Pollard invested him
with that indicia for a fraudulent purpose. And where the principal has
fraudulently or negligently INTRUSTED property to an agent with all
indicia of authority and ownership a third person purchasing from such
agent in entire good faith will be protected from any claim of the principal, although the agent may have been given possession for a special purpose and without authority to dispose of the same. 31 CYC., 1607. Also,
when a principal by any such acts has knowingly caused or permitted
another to appear to be his agent either generally or for a particular purpose, he will be ESTOPPED to deny such agency to injury of third persons who have in good faith and in the exercise of prudence dealt with
the agent on the faith of such appearance, 31 CYC., 1237. This rule has
been frequently applied in a great number of transactions many of which
fall within the rule that where one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the act of the third, he who has enabled the third person to occasion
the loss must sustain it. 31 Cyc., 1240.
The rights of a person to whom a bill of lading has been negotiated
are similar to those which are given him by the Warehouse receipts act
in so far as it concerns the POWER OR ABILITY of the negotiator,
consignor and consignee to convey, so no distinction is to be drawn from
the fact that part of the goods were placed in a warehouse and the remainder sent by rail.
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This case is not analagous to Craig v. Brown, D. L. R., November,
1913, page 59, for in that case principal gave instructions that the bill be
made NON-Negotiable and in the name of the principal. The agent acted
without the scope of his authority at the time the bill was made. The
principal in that case had no fraudulent motives.
Our conclusions are that the defendant Knox takes good title and
plaintiff's remedy is not to be found in an action of replevin against Knox,
but against Gardener in assumpsit for money had and received. Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
By some authorities it is said to be the rule of the common law that if
a bill of lading or warehouse receipt is endorsed in blank or to the order
of an agent and delivered to such agent, who is not authorized to sell the
goods, a person, even tho he be a bona fide purchaser, to whom the bill
is delivered by the agent acquires no title to the goods. 4 A. & C. Ency.,
550, Stollenwreck v. Thacher, 115 Mass., 224.
According to these authorities, which assert what is called the common law theory, the delivery of the bill or receipt, whatever its form, is
merely equivalent toga delivery of the goods.
By other authorities it is held that under such circumstances the purchaser for value and without notice acquires title to the goods. Bank v.
Armsby, 120 Ga., 74; 47 S. E., 589.
According to these authorities, which assert what is known as the
mercantile theory, the delivery of a bill or receipt is equivalent to the delivery of the goods and in addition, the form in which the receipt or bill
is delivered is a representation of title.
The reasons upon which the mercantile theory is based are equally
applicable where the bill is originally taken in the name of the agent with
the consent of the owner. By his theory the form in which a negotiable
bill or receipt is taken is a representation of title and therefore, one who
bails his goods and takes a bill of lading or warehouse receipt to the
order of another person is, in effect, making a representation that the title
of the goods is in that person. This representation is immaterial in any
dispute unless some one has bought on the faith of the representation.
"In such case the bailor should be estopped to deny the truth of the representation." Williston on Sales, sec. 425.
The intention of the framers of the uniform Bills of Lading Act, to
adopt the mercantile theory, in cases! like the present, is sufficiently manifested by the language of the thirty-eighth section which provides that
the "validity of the negotiation of a bill of lading is not impaired by the
fact that such negotiation was a breach of duty on the part of the person
making the negotiation."
This becomes still clearer when we are told by the framers that section 38 merely elaborates for the sake of clearness certain cases within
section 31" which "places order bills of lading upon the precise bases of
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negotiability as a promissory note, check or draft," for it is well settled
that an agent to whom a promissory note, check, or draft, endorsed in
blank has been given can transfer title to a bona fide purchaser. 7 Cyc.,
800.
Furthermore in the annotations to the act the framers frequently inform us that it was their intention to adopt the mercantile theory. This
theory would be most completely expressed by providing that the endorsee
of a negotiable bill acquires not only such title as the consignor had but
also such title as, according to the face of the instrument, the person to
whom the goods were deliverable or any subsequent endorsee had.
The thirty eighth section should be construed as meaning, in effect,
this, since it provides that an endorsee acquires not only such title as the
person negotiating the bill had but also such title as he tad power to convey.
In view of the obvious intention of the framers of the act to adopt the
mercantile theory, the underscored words should be understood as intended to cover cases where the form of the bill amounts to a representation of title in a particular person.
These remarks are equally applicable to the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
IN RE A'S ESTATE
When the Word "Children" Includes Illegitimate Children
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A died Dec. 1st, 1912, leaving to survive him one son and three daughters and the children of a deceased daughter. In his will which was duly
probated in Dec., 1912, he directs his executors who were also designated
as Trustees to pay to his son and. daughters the sum of $500.00 within
one year from the date of his death and the sum of $200.00 to each of his
grandchildren within one year from date of his death. He leaves the balance of his estate1 both real and personal in charge of the Trustees for
5 years. At the end of 5 years he provides that his real estate shall be
divided whereby each of his children will receive a farm for life and at
the death of either or all of his sons and daughters the said real estate
with the balance of personal estate shall be divided into five equal shares
or parts, or in other words the children of each of his daughters and his
son receive their mother's or father's share.
Note-One of the daughters in 1865 gave birth to an illegitimate son.
In 1870 she was married but not to the father of this illegitimate son.
This son however has always been recognized by "A" as a grandson.
The term used in the will in every pJace is "grandchildren" and this illegi-"
timate son of his daughter, who is living, has not been excluded in any
way, or in other words his name nor any of the names of any of his grandchildren, are mentioned in any part of the will. In referring to these
children of his son and daughters and of the children of the, deceased he.
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states them in all cases "grandchildren."
Is the illegitimate son of his daughter entitled to share in the
tribution of the $200.00 to be paid in Dec., 1913? The Executors
Trustees have paid all the grandchildren each $200.00 but refuse to
this illegitimate son the $200.00 which he claims. Is he entitled to it,
if so why?
McCann, for the plaintiff.
Watkins, for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
CAPIELLO, J. The main point to be determined in this case is, as
to the interpretation the courts give to the words "children," or "grandchildren" as used in the will of the Testator in this case.
At Common Law the description "child," "son," "issue," prima facie
means legitimate child, son, or issue. Leedom's Estate, 4 Del. Co., 418,
cited in P. & L., Dig. of Dec. 40,627.
The word "children" does not usually include illegitimate children,
unless they have been made legitimate by marriage or unless the testator's
intention to include them is clear either by express designation or necessary implication. 40 Cyc., 1451.
A gift to children means legitimate children only, unless it appears
that illegitimate children must have been intended. Appel v. Byers, 98
Pa., 481; Wettach v. Horn, 201 Pa., 201.
"When legally construed the term children is confined to legitimate
children." 1 Bouvier's Dictionary, 320.
The word "child" in its legal sense, carries with it the idea of the
married relation. Wettach v. Horn, 201 Pa., 204It might be said, that since this illegitimate child has always been
recognized by the testator as a grandson, he was intended to be included
with-the other grandchildren. But do the courts construe the word "children" to that effect? We think not.
It is not the actual intent but the legal intention by which a will must
be construed. Martindale v. Warner, 15 Pa., 471. This is authority for
the fact, that even if the actual intent of testator, as in the present
case, was to give the illegitimate child $200, failing in the instrument,
(the means of passing said gift), to differentiate, to particularize the illegitimate, the law must prevail and the legal intent of words contained in
the instrument of devising must be applied. To hold otherwise would be
to allow a man to say that he did not intend the natural and logical consequence of his acts. It would be an easy means of defeating a written
instrument, by use of the simple words; "such is not my actual intent."
The fundamental and cardinal rule in the interpretation of wills is that
the intention of the testator if not inconsistent with some established rule
of law or public policy must control. 30 Am. & Eng. Cyc., 661.
We think that the intention of the testator was! inconsistent with the
well established rule of law. Whatever the testator may in fact have
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had in his mind, we have no doubt that the illegitimate child of the
mother (his daughter) can take nothing under the terms of this will, because of the well established rule of law that the word "children" and
the like words are to be applied only to legitimate children, unless the illegitimate children are otherwise described so as to leave no doubt that they
are to be included. Appel v. Byers, 98 Pa., 479; Bealafeld v. Slaughenhaupt, 213 Pa., 565.
Applying this to case in hand, there was no description of the illegitimate, there was nothing to differentiate or individualize him, and now to
allow a contrary interpretation of the word children would be to set at
naught the sanctity of wills.
"Where the festator bequeaths or devises to a class, as to his children, nephews, nieces, issue, etc., no latent ambignity arises upon proof
of the existence of illegitimate children, etc., so as to admit parol evidence
of an intent to include them and the legitimate children, etc., take to the
exclusion of .the others, unless the intention of the testator to include
them is manifested by clear expression, or necessary implication on the
face of the will itself. 30 Am. & Eng. Cyc., 683; Flora v. Anderson, 67
Fed. Rep., 182; Heater v. Van Auken, 14 N. 3. Eq., 159; Appeal v. Byers!,
98 Pa., 479.
The act of April 27, 1855, as amended by act of 1897, does not legitimatize illegitimate children, it only gave the child and mother capacity
to inherit from each other as next of kin and heirs. Steckels Appeal, 64
Pa., 493; Grubles Appeal, 58 Pa., 55.
The act of 1901 amended by act of 1903, P. L., 70, we think has no
bearing on the question in this case whatever. The purpose of these acts
was simply to legitimatize the children in so far as to the mother and the
capacity of inheriting from the mother and each other.
The question here is not whether the illegitimate son could inherit
from his mother, but whether an illegitimate is to be included in the word
"children" when legally construed. By the law which we have stated
above, we think the word "children" does not include illegitimate children.
Therefore the petitioner is not entitled to the sum of $200, and the petition is dismissed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The decision of the learned court below is sustained by the authorities
cited. The decree is affirmed.

